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Companies are increasingly offshoring R&D activities. Many firms, however, experience difficulties 
related to virtual teamwork across cultures and time zones. The research question is: How does 
increasing R&D offshoring impact transparency of communication structures and knowledge sharing? 
Using case studies from Danish multinational corporations with R&D activities in China, India or 
Eastern Europe this paper analyses the impact observed in these companies in regard to 
communication structures and knowledge sharing in management of offshored R&D activities. The 
findings show that companies attempt to increase transparency through formalisation of knowledge 
and clear communication structures. However, the influence of tacit knowledge, horizontal 
communication and culture seem largely overlooked. Therefore the authors suggest a context based 
approach to transparency accustomed to the complexity of the R&D activity. This paper shows that 
management of offshored R&D activities touches upon many key management dilemmas like trust, 
control and knowledge sharing. 
 
1. Introduction 
   Advances in technology (e.g. the internet, 
telecommunication) and political shifts (e.g. the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, fewer trade barriers and an enlarged 
EU) have lead to increased global competition and new 
markets. This has enabled the rapid growth of companies 
offshoring various business activities including research 
and development (R&D).  
This paper employs the definition that offshoring occurs 
when ―...firms relocate their business functions (that were 
previously performed inhouse) to overseas locations.‖ 
(Kedia et al., 2009: 250).  
This can be achieved in one of three ways: 
1. Green field. 
2. Brown field. 
3. Buy up/consolidation (Colotla, 2003).  
The green field approach is when the company builds 
their own factory or office; the second when the company 
expands their current locations; and the last happens 
during mergers and acquisitions. Traditionally, companies 
first offshored production, and only later offshored tasks 
and functions further into the development process, from 
design to R&D. This creates an environment of cross-
cultural virtual communication and knowledge sharing in 
R&D activities, which spans cultures, national borders, 
and time zones.  
Knowledge and information creation, sharing and 
retention now have to span this virtual space. This has 
meant management of R&D are faced with new 
challenges. This can mean a loss of transparency as not all 
employees have the same information and the same 
understanding. It can also become unclear to headquarters 
about what each offshore location is doing, and for the 
subsidiary to fail to understand the reasons behind 
information and actions taken headquarters.  
This paper examines management of offshore R&D in 
relation to transparency. The research question is:  
How does increasing R&D offshoring impact 
transparency of communication structures and knowledge 
sharing?  
The data is based upon case studies of four Danish 
 multinational corporations involving many semi-
structured interviews. The article first presents a literature 
review on the topics of transparency, communication, and 
knowledge transfer relevant for management of offshored 
activities. The empirical method is then discussed, 
followed by an explanation of the data collection method 
with detailed findings. A conclusion and further research 
is presented in the final section.       
2. Literature review 
 
Offshoring is an important part of companies‘ 
internationalisation efforts (Hemmert, 2004). Despite the 
focus in recent years on learning and knowledge in 
internationalisation, few case studies have been carried 
out concerning organisational learning processes in the 
internationally developing firm (Lord and Ranft, 2000; 
Andersen, 2008).  
Andersen (2008) investigated learning processes in 
offshoring by two multinational Danish companies. His 
findings showed that: 
1) Routines play a role in guiding the initial 
international activities of companies accessing 
new countries; especially for experienced 
companies which have developed more routines. 
2) Organisational knowledge is vested in routines, 
which resist change. The persistence of existing 
organisational routines influences the learning 
abilities of organisations. 
3)    The speed and scope by which organisations 
learn to cope with increasingly foreign market 
conditions is     critically contingent on their 
ability to modify or discard existing mental 
models; i.e. to unlearn. Unlearning processes 
concerns routines that have grown obsolete and 
are discarded (Sinkula, 2002).  
Knowledge management has been defined in many ways 
but generally refers to how companies create, retain, and 
share knowledge (Argote, 1999; Huber 1991). This 
includes the procedures and techniques used to get the 
most from an organisation‘s tacit and codified knowledge 
(Teece, 2000).  
Knowledge can be separated into two main categories; 
explicit or tacit. 
 Explicit knowledge can be documented, 
categorised, codified, transmitted to others as 
information, and illustrated through 
demonstrations, explanations and other forms of 
sharing.  
 Tacit knowledge, also called personal knowledge 
or ‗know how‘, draws on the experience and 
learning of a person and includes habits and 
skills we do not always recognize as knowledge. 
It‘s hard to document and keep in the company, 
and often has a social and cultural element 
(Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Castells, 1996: 171-172; Debowski, 2006: 347, 
353, Hansen et al., 1999).  
Some authorities also include implicit knowledge 
(Wallace et al., 2004). Implicit knowledge is knowledge 
which ―…cannot easily be articulated by the person 
possessing it, but can be elicited and articulated by others. 
An example of implicit knowledge is the strategy adopted 
by an experienced designer to undertake a particular task 
in the design process.‖ (Ahmed et al., 2005:1-2).  
Explicit knowledge can be said to create an organisational 
memory for the organisation. It has three main functions, 
to: 
 1) Control what information is valuable enough to 
store and share with the organisation. 
2) Prioritize the information so only the most 
valuable is stored. 
3) Prevent information overload (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991).  
Knowledge can be transformed from one type of 
knowledge to another.  
Knowledge creation can be viewed as an activity which 
focuses on collaboration and accomplishing certain tasks 
(Nonaka et al., 1995). A company which offshores can 
need to transfer knowledge between several units in the 
corporation; the headquarters, sales offices, subsidiaries, 
supplies, customers etc. In (Nonaka et al., 2002) a model 
is proposed which states that new knowledge is created 
and transformed through a cycle of social interaction 
between these knowledge types through socialization, 
externalization, combination and internalization (see Fig. 
1).  
This model is called the SECI knowledge model and is 
based on the separation of tacit and explicit knowledge.  
 
 
Source: Boutellier et al., (1993: 2-11). 
Figure 1. SECI knowledge model. From (Nonaka et al., 2002) 
As figure 1 shows, knowledge generation and 
transformation can be illustrated as a circle with a spiral 
inside, in which explicit and tacit knowledge is connected, 
meaning that knowledge of one kind can be transformed 
into another kind. Knowledge transformation goes from 
individual to individual, individual to group, group to 
organisation, organisation to individual and then begins 
over again (Bleischwitz et al., 2004: 354).  
The following details each of these examples of 
knowledge sharing: 
 Socialization - individual to individual 
The sharing of tacit knowledge through face-to-face 
communication, or shared experience and shared 
understanding. An example is an apprenticeship.  
 Externalization individual to group 
Communication and reflection of tacit knowledge 
through development of explicit concepts.  In this 
way knowledge can be expressed through various 
 forms of communication (also music and visual art). 
For example, through unofficial and official 
meetings, or perhaps as an option to show the group 
through for example shadowing, where the group 
sees how the other person works by observing them 
in their daily routines. 
 Combination– group to organisation 
The combination of various elements of explicit 
knowledge. In this phase the concepts are systemised 
in a knowledge system, which integrates different 
kinds of explicit knowledge.  
In this manner tacit knowledge becomes accessible 
and understandable for all. Through these 
combination processes adjustments, reorganisation 
and (re)combinations can be created which can foster 
new knowledge. Examples are policies for saving and 
documenting knowledge and putting it to use in the 
organisation.  
 Internalization – organisation to individual 
The knowledge becomes part of the individual‘s 
knowledge base (e.g. mental models) and can then 
also be accessible to the organisation. From here new 
knowledge can be created and the process starts all 
over (the circle arrow on the figure). Examples are 
work policies loose enough to allow the individual to 
find a better way of conducting a given task.  
Virtual collaboration will often be missing the 
‗socialization‘ step; but for the multinational corporation 
to function optimally the knowledge transformation still 
needs to take place. Rasmussen & Wangel (2007) show 
that three main areas need to function for a virtual team to 
be successful; trust, identity, and knowledge sharing.  
Identity is connected to sharing a feeling of belonging.  
Trust can be defined in many ways. The one used here is 
developed by Rotter (1971) who defines trust as a 
generalized tendency to assume that others will fulfil the 
expectations one has of them. Complete transparency can 
be defined as ―complete information versus incomplete 
information‖ (Kanagaretnam et al, 2010). Key findings in 
a study Kanagaretnam et al (2010) show that 1) 
transparency (complete information) significantly 
increases trusting behaviour. This result persisted in 
repeated interactions. 2) Transparency appears important 
for trustworthiness in one-shot interactions. And 3) 
repeated interaction increases trust and reciprocity with or 
without transparency. These results suggest that 
transparency is important in building trust in business 
environments which requires collaboration between 
different entities which have not previously worked 
together (see for example Knowles, 2006). Transparency 
is important when a company has just started to work 
virtually.  
Even when a common identity is created and trust has 
been developed, knowledge sharing remains key ‗‗... 
knowledge transfer in dispersed teams is not an effortless 
integration of global diversity transmitted through digital 
networks, but involves often arduous, recursive work 
patterns with regular breakdowns in knowledge 
exchange‘‘ (Sapsed et al. 2003: 22). Organisational 
culture is ―The shared rules governing cognitive and 
affective aspects of membership in an organisation and 
                                                          
1
 All case companies are given synonyms to respect their 
wishes for anonymity.  
the means whereby they are shaped and expressed‖ 
(Alveson 2002: 3).  
Communication in a global organisation needs to consider 
the influence differences in subcultures at different 
locations in the global corporation, and national culture 
have on communication itself. According to Hall (1976: 
91) two types of communication cultures exist; low-
context and high-context communication, ‖...A high-
context (HC) communication or message is one in which 
most of the information is either in the physical context or 
internalised in the person, while very little is in the coded, 
explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context 
(LC) communication is just the opposite, i.e. the mass of 
the information is vested in the explicit code.‖ 
This review indicates that several elements are important 
for successful offshore management, among others 
culture, trust and knowledge sharing. To achieve this, 
transparency as a mediating factor is a key issue.  
 
3. Empirical method 
   The nature of the research questions suggested a case 
study approach due to their explorative nature of an area 
wherein unknown factors and elements are sought (Yin, 
1994). Multiple case studies were used to be able to make 
comparisons and to distance the researcher (Eisenhardt, 
1988). For consistency, all companies were large 
international corporations with headquarters and 
ownership in Denmark.  
Table 1 illustrates the case companies with regard to type 
of company, company work form, the position of the 
interviewees, and the number of interviewees. The cases 
were selected to get breadth in the dataset across sectors 
and sizes.   
Table 1. Cases and interviewee details. 
 
 
 
 
Company1 Type Work form   Positions Amount 
X1  B2B and B2C 
telecommunic
ation 
manufacturer 
Product 
based 
Vice 
presidents, 
managers  
3 
X2  B2B 
equipment 
and service to 
the raw 
materials 
sector 
Project 
based 
Vice 
presidents, 
managers 
11 
X3  B2B 
engineering 
consultancy 
Project 
based 
Managers 12 
X4  B2B service 
and 
equipment 
provider to  
the energy 
sector 
Project 
based  
Managers 3 
 Interviews were conducted with managers and vice 
presidents who managed different aspects of offshored 
R&D, both in the headquarters and in the subsidiaries. By 
interviewing employees in both corporate headquarters 
and at the subsidiaries a multifaceted perspective is 
gained. Vice presidents have insight into the decision 
process and justification surrounding offshoring, and can 
present another perspective to the managers - who were 
responsible for implementation and the daily management 
- on the research topic.  
The primary data source was semi-structured interviews; 
so structured questions were asked but the interview was 
open for new information. There was little or no 
documentation available in the companies on the research 
topic, which meant the interviews were the primary data 
source.  
The questions were related to issues seen as causing 
complexity, which tools were used to reach greater 
transparency and the observed implications of this – all of 
these issues seen in relation to its impact on knowledge 
transformation. Not all interviewees were asked all the 
questions as some questions were only relevant for certain 
groups. All the interviews lasted 50-70 minutes, and were 
audio recorded, transcribed and analysed.  
4.  Findings 
Table 2 shows the details of the case companies. The 
target countries were mainly China and India; the two 
companies with R&D in USA were due to a buy-up many 
years earlier and the unit served mainly the American 
market. 
All of the case companies had embarked on offshoring as 
a ‗learning by doing‘ process. There had been no clear 
strategy or details on how the relationship between the 
now offshored parts of R&D should be connected to the 
parts of R&D which remained at the headquarters. 
Communication details were also developed as the R&D 
assignments were moved, and followed standard virtual 
networking which the companies had used when they had 
offshored other elements of their product development 
process like production and basic design tasks.  
Table 2. Characteristics of the cases. 
Most of the case companies went through the same 
process when offshoring; if the company had production 
then it was offshored first and then the other phases 
followed, effectively going backwards in the development 
process. Only X2 wanted to offshore their research 
process as well as the development process; the others felt 
the key competences were at the headquarters so there 
was no gain by moving research abroad.  
X1 first offshored all of production, parts of production 
ramp-up, testing and refinement, detailed design, then 
outsourced all of embedded IT, offshored parts of the 
system level design and finally outsourced all of 
production.  
X2 outsourced all production from Denmark during a 
costcutting restructuring period from 2000-2004, first to 
Eastern Europe and then to China. In the 1990s, X2 had 
brought a company which had a subsidiary in India. Over 
the years this office grew, and slowly, as competencies 
were transferred, it received more knowledge-intense 
assignments. The Indian office now does most of the 
system level design, and all subsequent phases up to 
production for all standardized products.  
X3 created an office in China to serve the market there. 
Later design for foreign projects also draws  on resources 
from this location. X4 followed the same path as X3.  
The following sections present results relating to: 
1. The impact offshored R&D has on 
communication structures and knowledge 
sharing.  
Company 
synonym 
R&D 
abroad 
Countries 
with main 
offshore R 
and/or D 
activities 
Use of 
expats at 
offshore 
R&D 
location 
Future 
plans for 
R&D 
X1 Some D in 
China for 
Danish 
projects 
China No Move 
more D 
abroad 
X2 70% of D is 
in India, 
some R is 
being moved 
now to India 
too with the 
expectation 
to have ca. 
15% of R in 
India within 
the year 
India and 
the USA 
Only 
director of 
the facility 
in India 
Move 
more R&D 
abroad 
X3 D in USA 
for US 
projects 
D in China 
for local 
projects 
Some D in 
China for 
Danish 
projects 
 
China and 
the USA 
Yes; as 
experts and 
project 
leaders 
Move 
more D 
abroad 
X4 Some D in 
China for 
local as well 
as global 
projects 
China Yes; as 
experts and 
project 
leaders 
Move 
more D 
abroad 
 2. How multinationals try to enhance transparency 
for offshored R&D activities. 
3. The relationship between transparency, 
communication and knowledge. 
4.1 Impact of offshored R&D activities on 
communication and knowledge  
   The case companies showed that offshored R&D 
activities presented several challenges for management. 
These were related to culture and information sharing and 
understanding.  
1) Culture  
Culture was an element all the case companies saw as an 
obstacle, and it influenced all other  difficulties. It was 
visible in how information was communicated, what 
information was communicated, how information was 
understood and how the work was approached.  
The Danish interviewees felt their colleagues in India and 
China rarely wanted to deliver negative information, and 
that the employees in these countries found it difficult to 
ask questions.  
A manager from X2 explained it like this;  
―The Danish way is very simplistic but the Indians they 
blow small things up to huge achievements and everything 
is fantastic.‖ A manager from X1 added that, ―[A positive 
thing about how] very different the culture is, is that the 
whole culture is „get around‟. So when you see a problem 
and you can‟t solve it, you just get around it. So they don‟t 
find the root cause and they are not very good at that, but 
they solve the problem in some way.  
I mean that often there are goods stuck in Hong Kong 
transit, then, maybe it‟s time number 30 that they are 
stopped in Hong Kong. Still, they just go down and pick 
up the parcel and come home again. They don‟t solve the 
problem, they don‟t like find an agreement on how not to 
send it via Hong Kong. They just solve it and that‟s in 
many cases very positive, they just find some way and 
solve it. Just make a get around, that‟s what they do all 
the time. It is that it is the same for design of course. They 
[the Chinese colleagues] can make much more simple 
setups.‖ 
However, this simplicity can also be an obstacle if the 
goal is innovation and efficiency in the development 
process. Many of the Danish managers quickly got the 
feeling that their Indian or Chinese colleagues needed 
much more ‗hand holding‘ and ‗mentoring‘, as they asked 
for confirmation to a larger degree than the Danish 
engineers. However, they were much better at following 
directions, procedures, and processes.  
Where Danish engineers would be likely to debate the 
usefulness, efficiency and correctness of such codified 
tools, the foreign engineers would follow them as 
precisely as possible.  
 
2) Communication structures 
Virtual communication was seen as being difficult due to 
time zone differences and culture which meant differences 
in how information was delivered, to whom and how 
information was received and understood.  
A manager from X4 illustrated this; ―... the written 
communication can be difficult with all these details and 
misunderstandings can easily occur. And then if their 
English is different from our English it can also be a 
challenge.‖ 
A manager from X2, explained the issue with virtual 
communication as follows, ―It is very difficult to start 
something very big and very new when you‟re talking to 
this guy and he‟s talking to this guy and so on. It‟s too 
fragmented. The timing makes it hard for somebody to get 
a question from one group to the other [because they 
aren‟t all in the same video conference at the same time]. 
We can‟t be sure we get this question from one group to 
the other. So, it is like being an interpreter who translates 
from one to the other.‖ 
Coordination between subsidiaries and the headquarters 
and between the subsidiaries themselves was another 
challenge. A manager from X4 put it like this; ‖Um, the 
biggest challenge is to keep everybody informed about 
everything, because all the informal communication will 
not happen when people are not there.‖ The vice 
president of supply chain management at X2 illustrated 
this when he explained that standards had been developed 
for the whole multinational for how to approach and 
contract a supplier. However, many subsidiaries and even 
departments within the headquarters didn‘t know about 
this.   
Ensuring all had the same information and that it was up 
to date, followed and understood it the same way, was 
another area creating difficulties. A manager from X2 
explained the issue with information as follows, ―The guy 
who is fronting this [in our Indian office], this is a bright 
guy. So they are clever guys but the guys down here [the 
lower level engineers] are sometimes of another breed so 
we don‟t know how the [information flow is]…‖ 
All the case companies had similar information flows; the 
example of case company X4 is shown here to illustrate. 
The information flow at X2 is shown in figure 3; 
managers speak to managers and at times the top 
managers speak with the top managers in India but at the 
operational level interaction is seldom. Vertical 
communication happens isolated in each location, without 
the other locations having knowledge of the details 
concerning this.  
While the managers at the Indian site in theory could also 
facilitate contact, they rarely did this unless something 
very urgent came up. Communication was mainly 
initiated by the Danish headquarters and was mainly 
related to (1) division of new tasks and (2) checking up on 
and status reports for current projects.  
Checking was often done at least once a week at different 
levels of detail depending on how complex and valuable 
the offshored task is perceived by the headquarters to be. 
The communication and information initiatives, 
procedures and processes were created in and by the 
Danish headquarters.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Information flow in case company X2 
  
 
While the contact manager in India would understand the 
rules and assignments given, it was unknown to the 
Danish headquarters how the further communication 
channels in the Indian subsidiary were. As a result the 
product they got back could contain mistakes that the 
Danish headquarters had thought had already been 
resolved. The same was the case in the communication 
with the US R&D office.  
In some of the case companies, for example X3, the 
expatriates at the subsidiary sometimes made changes and 
additions to the procedures which came from the 
headquarters to make them fit better with the work 
patterns, culture and challenges they experienced in the 
subsidiary.   
To summarise, culture and virtual communication 
presented difficulties in communication and knowledge 
sharing for managers responsible for offshored R&D 
activities.  
 
4.2. Transparency in management of offshored R&D 
activities 
The case companies chose to counteract these difficulties 
by 1) simplifying the process or product sent abroad for 
development or 2) making the process more explicit.  
In order to handle difficulties with management of 
offshored R&D activities, the knowledge sharing and 
communication structures can become more explicit.  
The following actions were adopted in the case 
companies: 
1. Detailed documentation, procedures and 
processes of the task and the process offshored. 
2. A clear separation of tasks. 
3. One to one communication (manager to 
manager). 
Another way to handle difficulties was to simplify the 
production process and/or product. For example, some of 
the case companies offshored a function or task which 
was technically or technologically complex. To lessen 
misunderstandings and rework, they lowered the level of 
complexity in the development process or in the product 
itself as exemplified in the statement by the manager from 
X1 in the culture part of the earlier section. This 
simplification can take place in the development phase by 
employing known technologies, techniques and methods 
or in production by utilizing more manpower and less 
machinery.  
Most case companies tried to avoid difficulties with 
communication structures and knowledge sharing in 
offshored R&D with a more explicit development process. 
The interviewees meant that the processes needed to be 
codified in detail to ensure quality and facilitate clear 
communication. The reason was to lessen the chance of 
misunderstandings based on culture as well as the impact 
of virtual communication.  
X1 had an iterative development process of their products. 
This meant many interactions and communication 
between the Danish engineers and the R&D engineers in 
China. This increased the chance of misunderstandings in 
communication and of information. However, they 
avoided many difficulties by codifying their processes and 
using expatriate engineers who acted as liaisons between 
engineers in China and Denmark. Today the offshore 
location handles certain product lines from system level 
design to production. These product lines are the less 
technically complex lines as technology and educational 
level has meant X1 has had to simplify some of their 
processes to make them suitable for offshoring and to 
keep product changes to a minimum.  
X2 had first offshored production and thereafter 
outsourced a large part of it to reach cost benefits. X2 had 
chosen to grow their site in India as knowledge and 
experience with offshoring grew. Besides detailed 
documentation, X2 also used exchange programs 
extensively. In order to avoid cultural issues, X2 tried to 
hire only Indians whom they felt could work in a western 
business culture. They had also only moved standardized 
product lines to India so while design was needed it was 
minor changes carried out within clear specifications. 
R&D is being moved out during 2010 and requires 
interaction between R&D in Denmark, USA and India.  
A manager from X2 explained their situation;  
―You could say we are coming from the situation where 
we have a lot of senior people in the company who have 
the knowledge here [in their heads] and knew what to do 
without many manuals and stuff like this. We are now 
coming in a situation where these people are outfaced and 
we have a lot of newcomers in India so we need to put 
more and more knowledge into systems and manuals and 
concepts and we are also making configurations and 
things. One thing is that the communication should be 
very clear, verbally and written but preferably the written 
one should be clear because otherwise it will be 
interpreted in different ways.‖  
X2 had an additional issue affecting coordination with 
their office in the USA. A manager explained it like this,  
―It seems the Danish division has really managed to load 
India with a lot of things [by offshoring a lot of R&D 
tasks to the office] where the U.S. office has not managed 
to do the same. Of course they have not had so many jobs 
lately and they have not had the same percentage of 
offshoring that we have seen. They have been very 
reluctant to offshore anything so to say. They have special 
rules so the jobs done in the Indian company supporting 
the US is a bit different for what they did for Denmark 
and that is one is the things we are trying to avoid now. 
We say when we now apply the new system, everything is 
done the same way.‖ 
He went on to explain the reluctance the US office had,  
―The U.S. has always said that their customers were 
different from all other countries in the world. That they 
had other requirements. That they had to select other types 
of equipment than we would select for the rest of the 
world and they have different drawings rules as well. 
These things they said their customers require so they 
should be like this. We [in Denmark] are not so sure this 
is correct but we have tried during the years to minimize 
the fingerprint of these things. We know that there are 
some special rules in some states in the US for the 
platforms, handrail, stairs and stuff like this. Safety things 
are different from state to state and of course they have to 
follow this but besides this why couldn‘t they choose the 
ones we have chosen here? But their market is shrinking 
and they now have to follow our lines.‖  
As can be seen from these quotations, the main reason for 
complications was that the Danish headquarters didn‘t 
know what happened in the US office and vice versa.  
X3 let their offshore locations handle local projects but 
sent expects and project managers from the Danish 
 headquarters to assist and facilitate knowledge sharing. 
The headquarters had also started to offshore development 
tasks for projects managed from Denmark to China. The 
US office handled tasks for the US market and rarely 
interacted in any larger degree with the offices in 
Denmark or China. When needed, experts and project 
managers were sent from Denmark to the USA but locals 
(Americans) were mostly used. For X3 the focus was 
more on exchange programs and expatriation as sources 
of knowledge transfer and secondarily on developing 
procedures and processes. 
X4 had only recently started having development in 
China. They had several project managers, the leader of 
the subsidiary and experts stationed in China to facilitate 
knowledge transfer. The difficulties in communication 
and knowledge sharing of offshoring development to 
China had been a surprise and X4 counteracted it with 
increasing procedures and processes. These were 
developed on a ‗learning by doing‘ basis and were based 
on the ones used in Denmark but were more detailed and 
specific. While some of the expats chose to change the 
procedures and processes in some way to better fit it into 
the subsidiary‘s work pattern and culture the procedures 
and processes were mainly developed and conceived in 
the Danish headquarters.  
 The case companies reacted to the difficulties related to 
communication and knowledge sharing of R&D 
offshoring by: 
X1:  having early on developed awareness of the need for 
explicit knowledge of their development process and 
where this knowledge resided within the company. They 
lessened the impact of virtual communication and culture 
by using codified knowledge in the form of procedures 
and personified knowledge in the form of expatriates and 
exchange programs.   
X2: employing clear specifications, intense knowledge 
sharing through documentation and exchange programs, 
and a serious attempt to transfer the same western 
organisational culture to all their locations.  
X3: a clear separation of tasks (e.g. markets) between the 
different locations and heavy use of personified 
knowledge transference. Secondarily to use more 
processes, procedures and written communication.   
X4: codified knowledge and communication and 
streamlined communication whenever possible.  
Clear precise communication was already seen as a key 
goal.   
To summarize, management of offshored R&D 
encounters difficulties in the form of culture and virtual 
communication. Culture impacted communication and 
increased the chance for misunderstandings, rework and 
quality issues. Virtual communication of information and 
knowledge sharing across cultures made both knowledge 
and communication more difficult.  
The case companies attempted to counteract this and 
increase transparency by: 
1) Simplifying the development process or product 
sent abroad for development. 
 2) Making the process more explicit.  
The first was implemented by using fewer and less 
complex technologies (for example mechanical), 
employing known technology and development methods 
or in production by utilizing more manpower and less 
machinery.  
The latter, by attempting to codify as much knowledge as 
possible, to streamline communication and information 
and develop more and detailed documentation and 
procedures. In some case companies to clearly separate 
tasks and assignments and in this way limit the need for 
communication and interaction between locations.        
However, despite these attempts to counteract difficulties 
with knowledge and communication structures the case 
companies still fought with issues mainly related to: 
1. Creating transparency in each location and in the 
interaction between these. 
2. Ensuring everyone followed procedures and 
processes. 
3. Ensuring information was understood the same 
way. 
 
4.3. Relationship between transparency and 
knowledge transformation   
 
For all the case companies transforming communication 
and knowledge from verbal and tacit form into a format 
which could be written down, documented and codified 
was a key way to archive transparency. The 
transformation process took place in the headquarters and 
the documentation was then shared with the subsidiaries.  
Interviewees from X2 explained that exploiting their 
resources as best as possible was a main goal in regard to 
streamlining and documenting communication.  
A manager explained,  
―We are saying we want this unit [in India] to be able to 
support any of the companies out here so we will have the 
same tools, the same drawing rules and this and that. The 
drawings sent to U.S., Denmark or somewhere else 
whether it is product A or product B would look the same. 
You can imagine we are more than 10 000 people at the 
company and they all have their special opinion of how 
things should be. Even internally in Denmark it can be a 
problem... somebody may want to have their special 
fingerprint on a given drawing. So, even this we make 
manuals for [....] the Indians are better at looking into 
manuals. They are following the manuals where the 
Danes they are more reluctant. It is [not always] really 
being followed in Denmark while in India….You can be 
sure they are following it to the last sentence.‖  
In the case companies, interviewed managers in the 
subsidiaries often felt the documentation needed 
adjustment to fit the subsidiary or could be improved 
upon to make the described process or function more 
efficient – not just for the subsidiary but for the whole 
organisation.  
A manager from X4 explained it like this,  
―Yes, because some of the routines, if everyone has 
worked with them for a long time it takes a lot to start 
changing them. But new eyes say this is not a clever way, 
why do I have to type the same information twice on two 
different spread sheets and well, maybe you don‘t.‖  
However, the interviewed managers in the subsidiaries 
felt there was no way to communicate back to the 
headquarters about these changes. There were no 
communication channels, procedures or processes 
implemented which allowed for this.  
All the managers in the subsidiaries also explained that 
security measures for offshored R&D engineers were 
much more extreme than for their colleagues back in the 
Danish headquarters.  
 In X4 a security measure was for example that the 
managers had random checks of the employees‘ 
computers conducted; something they would never 
consider doing back at the Danish headquarters. The 
reason for this was a fear for intellectual property theft 
and loose laws for this, in particular in China. There was 
also more quality checks and follow up on work 
conducted by the engineers in the foreign locations than in 
the Danish headquarters to be sure the work was up to 
standards.  
 
5. Theoretical and practical implications 
   Rasmussen & Wangel (2007) identified three areas 
important for virtual collaboration;  
 
• Identity. 
• Trust. 
• Knowledge sharing.  
 
The companies which had few issues with coordination 
were mainly because they didn‘t coordinate between 
subsidiaries and that there were a clear division of tasks 
and responsibilities between each location.  
However, the danger was that the information flow and 
operation of each location was rather unknown to the 
headquarters and the other locations. While there 
frequently existed either a rule or even a procedure for 
sharing information often it was not followed or 
implemented. There was an implicit ‗us and them‘ 
mentality in the approach to communication between the 
headquarters and the subsidiary.  
The focus on status reports and other checkups as well 
strict security measures for foreign employees also 
indicates a lack of trust in the offshored R&D employees. 
This indicates that two of the three key characteristics for 
successful vertical collaboration - identity and trust - were 
not present (Rasmussen & Wangel, 2007).  
Communication was mainly from the headquarters to the 
subsidiary and on a vice president to vice president or 
manager to manager level. Using the SECI knowledge 
model there was knowledge sharing from individual to 
individual on the top manager and managerial level but 
not among the engineers carrying out the work which 
further created the lack of common identity, trust and 
transparency. Knowledge sharing from individual to 
group happened mainly separately in the headquarters and 
the subsidiary. Exceptions to this were the use of 
exchange programs and expatriation.  
How this was carried out at the subsidiary was largely 
unknown to the headquarters, further illustrating a lack of 
transparency. Sharing from group to organisation 
happened in the headquarters through the development of 
procedures and processes but managers in the subsidiary 
found it difficult to do the same. Sharing from the 
organisation to individual happened mainly through 
procedures and documented processes; a form of sharing 
not always successful as will be detailed more in the 
following.     
All the case companies had offshored or outsourced less 
value adding functions like production and low level 
designing. The  communication strategies they followed 
with these locations and suppliers could also be the reason 
why the case companies wanted to implement these 
procedures which were known to work in other offshore 
situations. The difficulties the case companies 
experienced reinforced the perception that these routines 
should be implemented. However, none of the 
interviewees questioned whether or not this was an 
appropriate approach. This learning approach to 
internationalisation is therefore confirming the findings by 
Andersen (2008).  
The companies all worked towards making as much 
knowledge as possible explicit as a way to further 
transparency. However, this was done mainly in the 
Danish headquarters and without involvement from the 
subsidiaries. As a result the influence of culture on 
communication persisted and transparency for the 
subsidiary was not reached. India and China are high-
context (HC) countries; most of the information is either 
in the physical context or internalised in the person, while 
very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the 
message.  
Denmark is a country with low-context (LC) 
communication, i.e. the mass of the information is vested 
in the explicit code. It therefore is easier to document and 
make communication and information explicit in 
Denmark. However, for a HC country like China and 
India it can be more difficult as the majority of the 
information lies in implicit codes. The example from X4 
in the previous section shows this when he attempts to 
adapt and change the procedures and processes he 
receives from Denmark to better fit the working 
environment and culture in China.  
The horizontal communication process employed in the 
case companies helped hide the cultural context in 
communication from the Danish headquarters as the 
managers they communicated with in the subsidiaries 
often had learnt the LC communication employed in 
Denmark.  
The less communication and interaction was needed 
between locations the easier it was to avoid difficulties 
with transparency in communication and possible 
complications with the impact of codification as a means 
to reach transparency. However, transparency was not 
reached in this manner; the problem areas were merely 
avoided.  
A lack of transparency as viewed from the subsidiaries in 
the development of the procedures and processes could be 
a reason why it was difficult for the headquarters to get 
subsidiaries in countries with HC-communication to 
follow the same procedures and rules. In other words, the 
subsidiaries did not take ownership of the processes and 
procedures as they were not developed with consideration 
for the cultural and virtual communication needs as 
viewed from the subsidiaries. There was therefore a 
resistance in some of the subsidiaries towards adopting 
these procedures.   
Another key issue the findings suggest with transparency 
through documentation and explicit knowledge is that the 
overall knowledge of the company could diminish if the 
tacit knowledge in the subsidiary which can be 
transformed in the manner detailed in the SECI model 
does not have the opportunity to do so. The focus on only 
certain aspects of the SECI model means continuous 
learning across the organisation won‘t take place. 
Furthermore, it may not be possible to codify all 
information and communication and an attempt to do so 
 could result in a loss of context which can make the 
resulting communication and information less valuable.  
The research question,  
“How does the increasing need for transparent 
communication structures in global R&D management 
determine virtual knowledge transformation?” can now 
be answered.  
The investigated Danish multinationals wanted to increase 
transparency by in the headquarters transforming as much 
implicit knowledge and verbal communication to written 
procedures and processes as possible and handed this to 
their subsidiaries. In other words there was a 
transformation from implicit knowledge towards explicit 
knowledge.  
The impact of this knowledge transformation was that it 
increased resistance to adopting new processes and 
procedures. In addition, not all communication could 
reach transparency through codification. Transparency 
was not apparent from the perspective of the subsidiaries 
by employing this knowledge transformation strategy. 
Finally transparency through codification does not 
consider the embedded cultural elements of 
communication.  
To summarize, multinationals offshoring R&D 
encountered increasing difficulties with global R&D 
management due to culture and virtual communication. 
The actions taken by the case companies to counteract this 
and gain greater transparency was simplification of the 
product or process or codification of knowledge and 
streamlining information sharing. These methods to reach 
transparency meant one-way communication and 
knowledge sharing; from the headquarters to the 
subsidiary.  
The impact was that knowledge and information residing 
in the subsidiaries was lost. There was no channel through 
which to communicate and share knowledge from the 
subsidiary which didn‘t fit the reporting structure and 
procedures implemented from the headquarters. 
Furthermore, the increased use of procedures and 
procedures for communication discouraged innovation 
and new ideas if these did not fit the implemented 
processes and discouraged unlearning of old routines. 
Furthermore, the cultural element within communication 
remained, making it questionable how successful a 
complete reliance on these transparency methods can be 
when it involves countries with both HC and LC 
communication cultures.  
6. Recommendations 
These findings enable us to suggest that companies 
should make themselves aware of the potential impact 
offshoring R&D can have on knowledge and 
communication. Before anything is moved abroad, the 
companies need to develop a framework for transparency 
in their management of offshore R&D activities.  
This can be reached achieved through: 
Modularity 
Headquarters divides R&D into modules or blocks 
which are each clearly defined and self-contained. This 
limits the need for communication and knowledge sharing 
across distances.  
Before moving a R&D task abroad, the headquarters 
needs to consider a number of factors which include (but 
not limited to): 
• The company‘s history with offshoring. 
• Maturity of the task affected by offshoring 
• The number of units involved 
• How tasks can be separated 
• The available codified knowledge 
• The cost of transforming needed explicit 
knowledge  
• The possibility of making this knowledge 
transformation. 
Modularity may be easier with simpler and more routine 
tasks than new and complex tasks.  
Collaboration 
Headquarters and the subsidiaries develop a 
communication and knowledge sharing framework which 
before anything is moved out considers a number of 
factors which include: 
• The company‘s history with offshoring 
• Maturity of the task affected by offshoring 
• The number of units involved 
• The communication cultures of the units 
involved 
• Virtual as well as horizontal communication with 
and involvement from engineers on all levels of 
the subsidiary  
• The available codified knowledge 
• The cost of transforming needed explicit 
knowledge  
• The possibility of making this knowledge 
transformation 
• The possibility to and cost of transferring 
implicit knowledge in its original form (e.g. 
expatriation, exchange programs) 
• Advanced communication and knowledge 
sharing technologies, that enhance mutual transparency  
It is suggested that the communication plan is developed 
in collaboration with the subsidiaries so they experience 
transparency in the process which will enhance trust and 
ownership. This could be done using collaborative 
methods like for example the creation of learning spaces 
or work space laboratories where managers and 
employees can perform proactive-creative workshops 
using for instance search conferences and scenario 
workshops, design games, interactive planning, 
participatory SWOT or future creative workshops 
(Rasmussen, 2008).  
Furthermore, the multinationals could create opportunities 
for networking or peer exchange between subsidiaries and 
knowledge institutions as a means of combining 
innovative and already practiced ideas and knowledge 
(Rasmussen, 2005). This would increase transparency and 
help build a common identity, trust and improve 
knowledge sharing; key elements for successful virtual 
collaboration. 
Greater insight into how transparency can be reached in a 
global R&D management and what tools to use to reach 
this goal is valuable in order for companies to make 
informed decisions. It leaves the option of improving 
efficiency and flow in the R&D process itself, and lessens 
the chance of costly rework. Offshoring becomes a 
 learning experience in greater internal understanding as 
much as a way to meet business targets.  
However, this article also shows that the company needs 
to be aware of the risks embedded in reaching 
transparency through knowledge transformation. 
Therefore, in this paper it is suggested that a company 
implement an offshore strategy in regard to transparency 
which include several aspects, such as the maturity of the 
R&D task, the number of units involved in 
communication and the available codified knowledge and 
likely cost and option to transform additional needed 
knowledge. 
In several of the case companies the managers in the 
subsidiaries had ideas on how knowledge and information 
could be shared and transparency could be improved. The 
case companies can use these results to have managers 
from both the headquarters and the subsidiary meet and 
conduct a workshop. Here they could analyse which 
aspects each of them believe course difficulties with 
communication and knowledge sharing at the 
headquarters, at the subsidiary and in the interaction 
between these and develop new ideas and plans together 
on how to increase transparency. By developing a new 
communication and knowledge sharing plan in 
collaboration the risk and responsibility is shared. 
Furthermore, transparency is reached within the decision 
process itself.   
 
7. Conclusions and further research 
   This paper investigated the connection between 
transparency and knowledge transformation in R&D 
offshoring using case studies involving four multinational 
corporations. Data was gathered through 29 in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with managers at headquarters 
and at the subsidiary.  
The research question was: ―How does increasing R&D 
offshoring impact management of communication 
structures and knowledge sharing?‖  
In the investigated Danish multinationals communication 
with the subsidiary was horizontal at the managerial level, 
but not at the engineering level.  
Communication was mainly from the headquarters to the 
subsidiary concerning new assignments and status reports 
on current work. Cross-cultural virtual communication 
had created greater difficulties with communication which 
had resulted in misunderstandings, rework and delays. To 
counteract this, the case companies had chosen to make 
the work processes more explicit or the product or process 
simpler. To achieve this, headquarters would transform as 
much implicit knowledge and verbal communication to 
written procedures and processes as possible and handed 
this to their subsidiaries. In other words there was a 
transformation from implicit knowledge towards explicit 
knowledge.  
Difficulties in communication remained as transparency 
was not reached inside the subsidiaries and 
communication inside the subsidiary was not clear to the 
headquarters. Furthermore, culture remained a key issue 
as certain cultures rely more on context and internalisation 
in the person than the explicit code of communication 
than others. As a consequence embedded cultural 
elements of communication were not considered by this 
attempt at reaching transparency. The impact of this 
knowledge transformation was that it increased resistance 
to unlearning of old routines and adopting new processes 
and procedures. In addition, not all communication could 
reach transparency through codification. Finally, 
transparency was not apparent from the perspective of the 
subsidiaries by employing this knowledge transformation 
strategy.  
This study shows the importance of understanding the 
connection between knowledge transformation and the 
need for transparency in R&D processes. From a 
financial, managerial and technical perspective an 
increased understanding of this connection from the onset 
of R&D offshoring could potentially prevent costly 
misunderstandings and rework. 
Further research is needed to understand in what 
situations transparency through codification are desirable, 
what type of communication can be the codified, the 
influence of culture on communication and how a two-
way communication between the headquarters and the 
subsidiary in the codification process would influence the 
success rate.   
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